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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE O,F UTAH
\L\LKER HANK & TRUST COMP .\XY, a Utah corporation,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
\\'. S. BRDIHALL, Commissioner of
Financial Institntiom; of Utah, BANK
OF' FTAH, BANK OF BEN LOMOND,
CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK,
FIRSrr SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
X.A., and COMMERCIAL SECURITY
B.\NK,

Case No.
11628

Def enda;nts and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPO,NDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by vValker Bank & Trust
Company ("Walker Bank") against W. S. Brimhall,
Commissioner of Financial Institutions of the State of
Utah, (the "Commissioner") pursuant to Section 7-126(4), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, for a
judicial review of the decision of the Commissioner denying the application of vValker Bank for permission to
1

t'stahlish a branch bank to be 1ocah·d in South Oo-den
b
,
Utah. The other defendant banks ·were protestants to
the application in the proceedings lwfore the
sioner and in the District Court were iwrmitted to inter.
VPnP as parties defendant.
DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT
'I1he trial court granted plaintiff's motion for sum.
rnary judgment and entered a declaratory judgment and
decree that the denial by the Commissioner of the applic-a tion of -Walker Bank for the establishment of thP
branch at South Ogden "is hereby declared to be erroneous and not in accordance with law, that plaintiff's
application for a branch bank at such location should
11ave been granted and that such decision, being unlawful.
is hereby set aside." The decree further ordered and
directed the Cmmnissioner to grant plaintiff's application for the branch bank in South Ogden.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the declaratory
_judgment and decree of the District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent accepts the statement of facts of appellants with the following clarifications and additions'.
Appellants have correctly quoted or paraphrast>d portions of the findings of fact, conclusions and order of the
Commissioner and of certain portions of the transcript
of testimony at the hearing before the Commissioner
2

rl'lw court is asked to consider in particular the findings
of fact, conclusions and order as a whole and in the context in which the same were written. -While we have
110 ohjeetion to the court considering the transcript of
te:"timony at the hearing before the Commissioner, we
:-:11ggest that corn;ideration of such transcript is not necc:-::-:ary for the determination of this case.

·we

also wish to point out that following the con<'lusion of the hearing the Commissioner asked for an
opinion of the then Attorney General, Phil L. Hansen.
ri'he Attorney General's first response was contained in
J1is opinion No. 68-045 dated July 26, 1968, a copy of
,rhich is set forth in the appendix to this brief. In that
(;pinio11 the Attorney General framed the question as
follows:
a branch bank be lawfully prohibited within
thP corporate limits of South Ogden, Utah, a city
of the second elass in which no unit bank is loeated, hnt which is immediately adjacent to Ogden
City, another city of the second class in which are
presently located five unit banks, where it is
shown by the e,·idence that the primary objective
of the branch bank is not to serve South Ogden,
in whieh it is physically to be located, but rather
to sPrve Ogden?
He concluded that the Commissioner coHld deny the
hranel1 on the grounds that the public convenience and
advantage "will be subverted rather than subserved."
'l'he Attorney General in effect left the ultimate decision
of granting or denying the branch up to the Commistiioner, based on his determination of public convenience
nnd adyantage. rrhe Commissioner was unwilling to de3

termine that the public convenience and advantage would
be "subverted" but instead determined, directly to the
contrary, that the public connmience and advantagt
would be snbserved and promoted by th(• t•stahlisln11e 11 t
of a vValker Bank branch in South Ogden ( Conel118ions,
par. 4, R. 7). However, the Commissioner di cl ask
for further advice which led to the Attorney General
issuing the opinion of August 15, 19GS, No. GS-055 ·wliieJ1
is set out in the appendix to Appellants' brief. In thi,
opinion, Mr. Hansen ruled that the Commissioner mu,t
deny the application as a matter of law even though h1:
had concluded that the public conveniPnce and advantag1·
would be promoted by the establishment of the proposed
branch bank. The Commissioner based his ultimate de.
cision
the application solely on the advice givrn
by the Attorney General (Conclusion 5, R. 7).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER WAS
NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.

We propose to answer here both Point I and Point II
of Appellants' Brief.
The sole question involved in the court below and,
we contend, the sole question involved here is the
sufficiency of the Attorney General's second opinion to
the Bank Commissioner dated August 15, 19G8. W1·
alleged in paragraph 7 of our complaint that the Corn·
missioner denied Respondent's branch application "solely
on the ruling of law set forth in the opinion of the Attor·
4

Gl'11ernl" (H. 3). This allegation was admitted by
tl1c Commissioner (R. 14) which, of course, in good
conscience he had to admit by the very terms of his
1nitten conclusions in the case (Conclusion, Paragraph 5,
R. 7). \Ve coute11ded below and contend here that the
"c\ ttonwy General's opinion and the Commissioner's dewere erroneous as a matter of law and the court
J:elow so determined.
JJt:.\'

An examination of the branch banking statutes upon
,, Jiich this case depends and which are fully quoted in
,\]Jpdiants' brief indicates that there are three prerequisites to the establishment of a branch by any bank. First,
tl1c· liank must have sufficient capital and surplus and
no one here questions the sufficiency of the capital and
Slll'Jll ns of Respondent for this purpose. Second, the
prnposed brauch must be located within the corporate
limits of a city or town in which city or town no other
!Jank is located. There is, likewise, no question but that
the proposed location of the ·walker Bank branch is
\rithin 8outh Ogden, Utah, and while there are three
branch hanks operating in that city, there are no unit
hanks in the city. 111 Walker Bank d!; Trust Company v.
Taylor, 16 U .2d 234, 390 Pac.2d 592, this court deterrni 1wd that the branch banking laws do not prohibit the
(·stablishment of a branch bank in a city in which only
branches of other banks are located.
rrhe only other requirement is that the applicant
show "to the satisfaction of the bank commissioner that
tlw public convenience and advantage will be subserved
and promoted by the establishment of such branch or
5

offiee.'' Here there can be no pro1wr contention that
the Commissioner was not so satisfied in view of hi,
Conclusion No. -! and his admission of paragraph G or
our complaint that "the public conveni(·nce and advantage would be subserved and promoted by the establishment of such branch at the location proposed." (R.
14)
The Attorney General initially recognized these as
the three requirements for the establishment of a branch
hank for in his opinion of July 26, 1968 he advised the
Commissioner that he would have grounds for determining that the granting of the \Valker Bank applica- ·
tion would not subserve and promote the public convenit'nce and advantage. In doing so, he assumed and state<l
that the "specific statutory prohibition [as to location]
does not foroolose the anticipated branch hank" and
further, that the applicant must "show that the public
convenience and advantage will be subserved by the new
facility." The applicant here met that burden and the
Commissioner specifically found that it had ml't the bmden. 'rhe Commissioner was unwilling to conclude that
because the branch facility would be located nPar the
8outh Ogden Cit)· boundary or that because applicant
showed that it would draw customers from areas outside
of South Ogden that thereby the public convenirncP and
advantage would not be subserved and promoted. When
the Commissioner refused to take the'' hint,'' r. Hanse11
forced his hand by holding in his second opinion of
August 15, 1968 that he must deny the Walker Bank
application as a matter of law. In doing so he read into
the branch banking statutes a requirement that simpl'
6

does not exist, a requirement that would limit the service
area of a branch bank to the city limits of the city in
which the branch facility is located.
At this point we call the court's attention to the
Jersey case In re Application of Howard Savings
J11sfit11fio1l, 159 A.2d 113 (N.J. 1960). In this case the
Court of New Jersey upheld the determination
of t!H· NPw Jersey Commissioner of Banking and Insurall('(' apfH'O\'ing the application of a savings bank to
e:,;tahlish a branch in the incorporated area of North
Caldwell. The opinion describes the geographical and
"co11omic situation of the area indicating a typical situation of urban sprawl affecting seven city areas. (This is
analogorns to the situation here where North Ogden, Ogckn, South Ogden, Riverdale, Roy and other North Davis
Count.\· communities tend to run together and constitute
a :-oing-Je metropolitan area.) A large increase in population had occurred. The cities were essentially residential
communities and the retail center for the area was the
wajor cit.\· of Caldwell with only a few retail businesses
in the other cities. There were no banks or branches
lo('ated in Korth Caldwell but there were banks in Caldwell. The CalchYell City boundary was about 400 feet
W<'st of the branch site in North Caldwell. Immediately
aeross the street from the branch site was the city of
Essex Fells, which had no banks or branches, and about
700 feet east of the branch site '.vas the city limits of
Verona in which city was located another bank.
The New Jersey statute permitted branch banks to
lw e>stahlished in a municipality in the same county in
which the applicant bank had its principal office "in
7

which no banking institution has its principal office or
a branch office." The Commissioner of Banking was
required to determine "that the inkrests of the public
will be served to advantage by the establishment of suc] 1
branch office." The Commissioner was also required
to determine that the conditions in the "locality in which
the proposed branch office' is to be established" indicatP
that the branch could operate successfully (Utah has
no such requirement).
It was contended that m determining whether the
branch office could be successfully operated, the Commissioner and the applicant were limited to evidence of
business to be derived from the particular municipality
in which the branch was to be located. The court held
that instead the proper criteria was the area to he served
by the branch even though this ext0nded beyond municipal boundaries. The branch must he 0stablished within
the boundaries of a municipality but the Commissioner
must consider the economic effect of the proposed branch
to determine whether the criteria of public i11terest ancl
successful operation are met. The court stated that
plainly the criteria of public interest was to be co11siclerecl on a service area basis.
It is indeed most a1ipropriate that the vital
questions of public interest and prohahl<> success
be viewed without rt>gard to mere artificial lines.
Banking, like any business and most human activity these days, is not and should not be confined
by political boundariPs. Cf. Duffcon Concrek
Products v. Borongh of Cresskill, 1 N.Y. 509, 5i::l,
64 A.2d 347, 9 A.L.R.2d 678 (1949). RPalism is
the sounder basis of anv substantive test. In
banking that is best indicated by conditions in and

8

of the whole an•a ·which the proposed institution
or branch would normally expect to draw upon
and serve. Again we cannot 4uarrel with the basis
prescribed by tlie Legislature, either alone or in
conjunction with the initial municipal requisite.
(159 A.2d at 123)
Hansen concluded in his second opinion and Appellants argue in their brief that the branch banking statutes are designed to protect banks from competition of
ont of city banks. This argument is based solely on the
admitted fact that branches cannot be established in
unincorporated areas of counties (other than Salt Lake
Connt:·) or in incorporated areas (other than Salt Lake
Cit:·) in which any unit bank is located whereas unit
hanks can be located in such areas. The conclusion is a
romplete non sequitur. Banking is a regulated industry,
but it is regulated for the public interest, not for the
interest of existing banks. Excessive competition is an
t·l1•nwnt to be considered in determining whether the
establishment of a new branch would be in the public
interest, but this determination is made from the point
of view of the public rather than the banks which are
affected by the competition. The question is whether
tl1t> new facility is needed by the public and, if establisht>d, whether the competition would jeopardize the
safety of existing institutions to the detriment of the
pnhlic. These considerations are present for a new unit
hank as well as for a new branch bank. The Commissioner here found and concluded that existing banks in
the Ogden metropolitan area (and this includes all of the
protPstant banks) are financially stable and secure institutions, that increased competition from the proposed
9

vV alker Bank branch would not unreasonably intnf

with the operation of these existing banks and branches
and that such competition "would not jeopardize the
depositors of such banks, would not interfere with
ability of these banks to maintain their finanrial strPngth
and ·would not impair their ability to compete with thP
applicant bank and other banks."

Furthermore, if avoiding bank competition is a legislative policy, it is enunciated most strongly in the statutes pertaining to the establishment of unit banks. A unit ,
bank can be established only if the Commissioner detPrmines, among other tirings, that:
"the location or field of opPration of th<> proposPd
business . . . [is not] in sueh proximity to an
established . . . [financial institution] that such
established business might bP unn·asonahi>· intPrf ered with . . . . " ( SPction 7-1-:2() ( 1 ) , t ·tali Codi·
Annotated 1953).
Note that under this section consideration must be given
to the effect on all existing financial institutions, both
existing unit banks and existing branch banks, considPration must be given to proximity, in the sense of distance
at least, without regard to boundaries of cities or towns.
and finally consideration must be given to not
the location of the new unit bank, but also to its field
of operation or service area. None of these requiremt>nt::;
are in the branch banking statute except for branelws
in Salt Lake County where a branch may not be estahlished "in such close proximity to an established bank
or branch as to unreasonably interfere with the businP8S
thereof." (7-3-6) The omission of these specific require-

10

i.

ments makes it much more logical to find a legislative
policy indifferent to competitive effects on existing banks
in connection with branch bank applications outside of
f-:alt Lake County.
The better answer to the whole question is stated
hy the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Haward Savi 11qs case as follows:
Evident from the statutes is a fundamental
distinction hetween the basic physical requisites
for a new hank or savings and loan association
and for a branch office. The fonner can be established in a political subdivision where another
similar institution already exists; a branch cannot he, although it may be permitted in the next
rnnnicipalit,\' and thereby compete. We see no
reason 1Ch.1J the Legislahtre cannot so differentiate
if it chooses to do so or why it may not use the
economically artificial municipal boundary as the
preliminary mcci.s11ring rod. There is the advantage of initial certainty. Moreover, a new bank
is an expensive undertaking and is generally proposed or organized by local people in response
to some local need for additional banking facilities, fairly broadly felt and with sufficient depth
to warrant the capital risk. The statutory scheme
quite properly gives preference here to local interests organizing the new facility as against an
out-of-town institution seeking to seize the opportunity to establish a branch and thereby compete
in close quarters with a bank already in existence.
Bv the same token, where there is legitimate room
in. an area for further banking facilities, it is
Pntin•lv reasonable to say that establishment of
a comiwting outside
should not be permi tkd right next door, so to speak, to the established institution, but that competition may be
11

allmccd, if in the zmlJlic interest, from a location
across the mu11icipal boundary. Also, some muni-

cipalities in need of banking facilities rnav not
have sufficient local capital or pot<>ntial to
creation of a new institution but their ncc<l an;]
convenience may be• adt•quately mPt by the ma; 11 _
tenance of a lt>ss exrwnsive branch. Stokt•s, supra,
74 Banking Law J onrnal at i>.
It is well
kno,vn that branch banking is a controvt>rsial subject, substantially not permith>d in New J ersrv
outside the muncipality of the principal
until 1948, and it seems appan•nt that the L('gislature, in prescribing the physical scheme it hal',
adopted a compromise between competing inte-rests in the banking field, which was f•ntirel,\- within
its power to do. (159 A.2d at 122; empl1asis add(•d)
'I1his we contend is the same type• of policy adopted by
our legislature - a resolution or compromise between
competing banking philosophies done on the basis of
geographical prohibitions and in reliance on the ability
of the Commissioner to determine the public convenience
and advantage.
The Attorney General and Appellants both argue at
great length that Walker Bank is by a subtPrfuge tryingto establish a branch where it cannot legally establish a
branch. \Ve take it that neither Appellants nor the former
Attorney General mean by the word "subterfuge" that
\Valker Bank is attempting by some trick or device to
conceal the true facts of this case or obtain an under the
table advantage. Respondent has at all times hPen frank
and open in its presentation of its application. We have
always pointed out that we believed that the proposed
branch would serve an area not only of South Ogden
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but of other parts of the Ogden metropolitan area induding Ogden City itself, other parts of \Veber County
and parts of North Davis County. Respondent is not
attempting to avoid anything but rather to comply with
the branch banking statutes and present our application
on a realistic basis. We again call the court's attention
to the statement in the Howard Savings case quoted
above (supra, p. 8) that banking is not and should
not be confined by political boundaries. Under our law
Oie branch must be established within the boundaries of a
municipality in which a unit bank is not located, but
tl1en' is nothing in our statutes that limits the service
area of the proposed branch to the municipality in which
it was located. The Commissioner cannot realistically
assrss the public convenience and advantage element of
tlH' statute unless he is presented with evidence of what
thP service area of the proposed branch is likely to be.
1lt>rP \Yalker Bank showed that the proposed branch
\\ ould sPrve South Ogden and would also serve Ogden
and othn areas in "Weber County and North Davis Count.'· in tlw Ogden metropolitan area. Taking this into
aceount, the Commissioner found that the public conveniPnce and advantage would be subserved and promoted.
Nothing further was required.
\Ve agree with Appellants that courts have been
quick to strike down evasions of branch banking laws.
lf \Valker Bank was here trying to move its main office
at Second South and Main Street in Salt Lake City or
another branch of vValker Bank to South Ogden, Utah,
we are sure this court would look very closely at the situation and likely follow the decisions of Marion National,

13

Bank i:. Camp (Dist. Ct., N.D. Ind. 19()8); Bank of Dearborn v. Saxon, 244 Fed. Supp 394, 377 Fed.2d 496 and
In re Princeton Bank & Tru;,t Cornpany (N.J.) 208 A.2d
820. The court might similarly be concerned if \Valker
Bank had not applied for a branch in South Ogden, but
instead set up a night depository and an armored car
pickup and delivery service to serve South Ogden and
other parts of the Ogden metropolitan area similar to
the bank involved in Dickinson v. First National Bank
in Plant City, 400 Fed.2d 548. We know we would be in
trouble if after opening the South Ogden Branch we
rplocated it in Ogden City, which was the effect of the
decision in American Bank d!; Tru;,t Com1Hrny 1.:. Saxon,
373 Fed.2d 283. No such "subterfuge" is involved here.
Our object is and has been to serve the public and om
own best interests by locating a branch bank within the
city limits of South Ogden to serve South Ogden and
other parts of the Ogden metropolitan area (and, for that
matter, anyone else wherever located who chooses to do
business with us at the South Ogden branch).
Appellants, of course, cannot contend that tlw branch
banking laws prohibit a branch from accepting husiness
from any other place than the municipality in which thr
hranch facility is located. If this is so, the practical
result would be to make illegal all or at least most of the
existing branches of all banks in the state, including the
South Ogden branches of the Appellant banks. All of
these banks have admitted that they accept business at
these branches from outside of South Ogden (see Requests for Admissions (R. 22-27) and the various answers
to such requests (R. 50-56) - Commercial Security Bank
14

having failed to answer, the requested admissions are
deemed admitted; also see Protestants Exhibit B showing that the South Ogden branch of Bank of Utah had
a :·mbstantial number of customers from areas outside
of South Ogden including some customers who lived in
Ogden City across the street from the Harrison Boulevard and Washington Terrace Branches of Commercial
Security Bank, Tr. 269-270.
'l1he offices of all banks can and must be permitted
to accept business from wherever that business comes
C\'Cll if it comes from a municipality or geographical
area in which the office itself cannot be located. To conthe statutes otherwise would create an impossible
,.,ituatiun. One foresees a bank officer (or worse, a bank
vxaminer) meeting each customer at the door with a
re<1uest to identify the area in which the customer lives
or does business and barring the door if the customer
is from a "prohibited" area. Such an interpretation is
ohvionsly not a part of the Utah statutes nor would any
L(·gislatnre attempt to impose such a requirement.
If Appellants and the former Attorney General mean

tl1at a bank cannot locate a branch in a municipality
\\IH're one of its objectives in locating the branch is
to s0ne people living or doing business outside of the
rnunicipality, then the branch banking laws rest on an
unstable foundation indeed. It is no exaggeration to say
that testimony from a branch applicant would be false
if the testimony was that the applicant bank would only
do businPss or expect to get business from the municipality in which the branch was located. Testimony would

15

b<> similarly suspect if the applicant claimed that the
soh• or primary purpose in establishing the branch was
to sl'rV<" the citizens of South Ogden or some other city
or town. Any bank in establishing its first office or
branch office hopes to serv(• iwo1)IP who liv<• or 1rork
near the office as well as those from other areas who
choose to do business at that office. The banking husiness simply does not operate on the hasis of wlwre a
customer lives, works or has a place of business in relation to the location of the hanking facility. A customer
li-dng many miles away may find it convenient for his
purposes to do business at a particular location. If a
branch applicant was required to prove that business
would not be accepted outside of the municipality in
·which the branch was located, no further branches could
be established in the State of Utah because no bank could
truthfully giYe such testimony.
If the Legislature had intended to limit branch hanking on a service area basis, it would have said so. 'l'he
concept of a service area is a familiar one to the Legislature for in connection with unit bank applications the
Commissioner is required to determine that the "firld
of operation" of the proposed unit bank will not unreasonably interfere with existing financial institutions.
7-1-26(1). Having failed to specify this in the branch
banking statutes, there is no basis for implying such a
requirement.
The fact remains, then, that the location requirements of the branch banking statutes are simply that
the branch office itself must be located within a certain
area as defined by the statute. A striking application
16

of this is the case of First National Bank of Ccvnton v.
('a11ton Exchange Bank, (Miss. 1963) 156 So.2d 580. In
that case the statute permitted a branch office to be
vstablished in a county in which the bank establishing
the office is domiciled, but prohibited establishment of
tlw branch office in certain towns or cities which had
one or more banks or branch banks in operation. The
town of Ridgeland in Madison County, Mississippi, is
within the county in which both the First National Bank
o :· Canton, a national bank, and the Canton Exchange
Bank, a state bank, were located. Both banks applied
J'or branch offices in the town of Ridgeland, the state
hank to the State Comptroller and the national bank to
1l1e Comptroller of the Currency. Both applications were
U]>proved within a short time of one another, but the
national bank opened up its office in the town first.
Tlte state bank opened up its office some two wooks
latt•r, but when it determined that it was within the town
limits, it moved the office across the town boundary line
to a location outside of the town, but only 200 yards
away from the national bank office. Against the contention of the national bank that this was a maneuver to
eircnmvent the requirements of the branch banking law,
tl1t• court held that the state bank could lawfully establish its branch office. Of course, the court did not find
that the move was motivated by the objective of evading
and circumventing legislative policy but this does not
distinguish the case as a precedent. The court, instead,
applied the statute according to its terms holding that
it "is plain and unambiguous and obviously must be construed to mean what it says." .Judge Hanson in this
ras0 ruled consistently with the Canton case and for the
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reasons cited by the Mississippi court we suggest that
this court must affirm his ruling. This court held in
Walker Bank & Trillst Co. v. Tay.Zar, supra, that what
is not permitted by the branch banking statutes is prohibited but it must follow that what is permitted is not
prohibited.
Finally, Appellants have in their brief at pages lj
and 16 and under their Point II contended that there is
a fourth statutory criteria in our branch banking laws
which, as we understand the contention, is a broad genf:ral discretion vested in the Commissioner to den.'- a
branch application even if the applicant has the necef.:sary oopital and surplus, will locate the branch in an
area open to branching and has establised that the public
convenience and advantage would be subseryed and promoted by the establishment of the branch. Such discretion, if granted by the Legislature, would undoubtedly
be unconstitutional. \Ve still have a government of la\rs
and not of men. Uncontrolled discretion in any person,
however praiseworthy his motives, however searching his
inquiry, however informed and devoted he may be, is
not tolerated under our system of laws. There is wry
clearly a right to the approval of an application where,
as here, the three statutory requirements have been met.
This is not to say that the Commissioner does not
have discretion. He clearly does in the determination of
whether the public convenienct• and advantage would he
subserved and promoted. Under this category he wry
proper!:-- can consider any number of factors such as
the type of service proposed by the applicant ( Commis18

siouer's Findings Paragraph 12, R.6), the financial con1litio11 arnl history of the applicant and the character and
pa:-:t performance of its management (Commissioner's
Findings Paragraph 15, R.6). One can suppose numerous
other factors which the Commissioner might consider.
Howe'»er, having considered these factors and exercised
tl1<' proper discretion given to him to measure the public
eorn'1•11ience and advantage, there is not a further area of
disrn·tion left. If such were the law, judicial review
\\·onld hc- meaningless and, more importantly, the public
illte>rest roulcl be "subverted" by an irresponsible Bank
C'ommi ssioner.
POINT II
THERE ARE NO UNRESOLVED ISSUES OF FACT
IN THIS CASE.

Appellants on pages 32 and 33 of their brief have
c·orrectl>, summarized the pertinent pleadings and the
aetion of the District Court in striking the pleaded defrnsP of the protestant banks that the Commissioner's
finding of convenience and advantage was not supported
h>· the evidence. The initial question, then, is whether
tlw motion to strike was properly granted.
Respondent took its appeal from the Commissioner's
ch•nial of its application by filing an action in the Distrid Court of Salt Lake County as required by Section
7-1-26(4), Utah Code Annotated 1953. The appeal was
filed on September 25, 1968, which was within 30 days
nftPr the decision as required by such statute. Only the
Commissioner was named as a defendant. It was not
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until October 21, 1968 that the protestant banks made
tht>ir Motion to Intervene which motion was graiit\·d
by Order dated October 25, 1968. Both tht> filing of the
Motion to Intervene and the granting of the Order vermitting the intervention occurred after the ex1iiration of
the 30 day period within which appeals can bt• takPn from
a decision of the Commissioner. The Commissioner aid
not contend in his answer that there "-as insufficient
evidence to support the conclusion of public convenience and advantage. This was raised only by the intervening banks. The Conunissioner did not and has not
sought to amend his answer to raise this issue and,
accordingly, we contend he cannot properly raise it on
appeal.
So far as th0 protestant banks are concernPd, they
have not appealed from the decision of the Commissioner
within the time required by the statute. The present
action was filed by Respondent 16 days after the decision
of the Commissioner was rendered. The protestant banks
not only had the same 30 days for appeal that Respondent had, hut had 14 days after this action \Vas filed within
which to file their own appeal if they felt any part of
the decision was wrong.
One must also consider the fact that the protestant
banks are only intervenors in this proceeding. They must
accept the action in the status in which it was at the timr
of the intervention and are in no position to broaden the
issues to a determination of a point on which they may
feel agrieved. As persons with an interest in the outcome
of the appeal and feeling that they might not be adc20

quately represented by the Attorney General, they are
clltitlc<l to intervene under Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, but they must accept the action in the status
in which it is at the time of the intervention. This is
particularly true when they failed to file a timely appeal.
:Notwithstanding, the defense if permitted does not
raise a question of fact. This is an appeal from an administrative proceeding on which a record was made. It has
lwt>n the Pstablished policy of this court to consider
such appeals only on the basis of the record and not
permit a trial de novo in the sense of receiving or conadditional testimony or other evidence presented
to thP court. See, for example, Withers 1/. Golding, 100
U. 179, 111 P.2d 550; Erkman v. Civil Service Commis,,w11, 118 U. 228, 198 P.2d 238; Building Service Emj1loyecs, etc. v. Newhoitse Realty Co., 97 U. 562, 95 P.2d
507; Goodrich v. Public Ser1/ice Commission, 114 U. 296,
198 P.2d 975; Hotel Utah v. Industrial Commission, 116
e. 443, 211 P.2d 200; Chapman v. Graham, 2 U.2d 156,
270 P.2d 821. If this were done here, the examination of
the conrt would be limited to a question of law - based
on the record was the finding of the Commissioner of
public convenience and advantage a proper one or, more
and in the terms of Seetion 7-1-26(4), was this
finding and conclusion "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law."
\Vhile we believe, for reasons already stated, that the
<1efonse was properly stricken and that this finding and
conclusion cannot be properly inquired into, if this court
it- inclined to engage in such inquiry, it has before it the
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entire record before the Cormnissioner with which to
make a final determination. In the interests of the best
use of judicial time and effort and for a faster disposition of this case, we suggest that it would be inappropriate for this court to reverse the District Court simply
on the basis of an erroneous granting of the motion to
strike, but rather the court here should inquire into the
sufficiency of the defense on its merits. \Ye are confident that if the court ·wishes to make such an inquiry
that the record amply supports the Commissioner's conclusion that the public convenience and advantage would
he suhserved and promoted by the establishment of tlw
\Valker Bank branch in South Ogden. Certainly there is
nothing in the record that would indicate that in making
snch conclusion the Commissioner's action "-as
or capricious. Particularly is this true when the Commissioner was careful enough to inquire of the Attorney
General on two occasions concerning this precise case
and when he was unwilling, notwithstanding the Attorney
General's prompting in his first opinion, to conclude that
the public convenience and advantage would not be subserved.
POINT III
THAT PART OF THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER
REQUIRING THE COMMISSIONER TO APPROVE
WALKER BANK'S APPLICATION FOR THE SOUTH
OGDEN BRANCH WAS LAWFUL AND NOT ERROR.

The appeal from the Commissioner's decision was
made because he committed an error of law in d(•nying
W alkf'r Bank's application for the South Ogden branch.
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Appellants in their brief at page 37 concede that the
Commissioner denied the application as a matter of law
hrcause that is what the Attorney General told him to do.
This appears to be a concession that but for such instruction from the Attorney General the Commissioner would
have granted the application. Of course this is apparent
from the fact that the Commissioner found all of the
neePssary three statutory conditions had been fully satisfied by Respondent. It would be a useless gesture for
this court or any court to remand the case for the taking
of further evidence or to assume that any question of
fact remains.
Appellants argue, however, that the review statute
does not grant authority to the court to order the applieation granted. No precedent or authority is cited for
this proposition. It would appear to us that the terms
of the statute empowering the reviewing court "to hold
nnlawful and set aside any act, decision or ruling of the
. . . commissioner . . ." is ample authority to grant an
application which was denied illegally. This is particularly true when the Commissioner has made an error
as a matter of law. Arguably a reviewing court might be
reluctant to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner where the question involved factual issues relating to the public convenience and advantage element
of the branch banking laws. But where the Commissioner
has made an error of law, the courts are authorized and
required to correct such error and to grant the relief
prayed as if such error had not occurred. If having found
:m Prror of law or an arbitrary or capricious act by the
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Commissioner, the reviewing court must n•mand so that
tlw Commissioner could exerci::-;e tlw ''discretionary
powers" claimed by Appellant8, such discretion mi()'ht
b
well be exercised to ignore tlw ruling of the reviewinirt'l
court. Such negation of judicial review cannot he tolerated.
Appellants fnrther argue that because of tlw lapst·
of time, the Commissioner should have a further opportunity to examine into the merits of the application. Tl1is
is an argument verging on the ridiculous for its snggPsts
that once the laborious process of a pplica ti on, ]waring,
review in the District Court and review by this court has
been concluded, there must be a further hearing or at
least fnrther proceedings beyond that. \V alker Bank
filPd its application for this branch on :March 21, 19GS.
rrhe hearings on the application commenced April
19GS and after two days of hearings, the matkr was contined to May 13, 1968, the continuance being granted at
the request of the protesting banks, not the request of
\Yalker Bank. The two Attorney General's Opinions
were requested by the Commissioner at the bP11est of till·
protesting banks and were not reqnested by \Valker Bank.
vVhen the Commissioner finally entered his Order on
September 9, 1968, an appeal wa8 filed within two weeb
aftPr and was pushed fonvard as rapidly as possible as
the record "·ill disclose. To say now that this less than
normal delay of litigation makes the factual basis of the
decision unrealistic is a conclusion that is basically unsupported by the facts and certainly not justified for the
particular case. After expediting the matter as we have,
Appellants are in no position to claim that we must reliti24

ga tC' the catw if Appellants are uuable to convince this
<'ourt that the Commissioner did not err as a matter of
law.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons it is submitted that the
dPt1•rmination of the District Court was proper and
"honld he affirmed in all respects and Respondent should
lw awarded its costs.
HPspectfully snhrnittPd,

H. R. ·wal do, .Jr.,
of .JONES, \VALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent \Valker Bank &
Trust Company
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APPENDIX
OFFICE OF THE Ar:l'TORNEY UENEHAL
STATE OF UTAH
OPINION OF LA vV
No. 68-045
Requested by vV. S. Brimhall, Commissioner of Financial
Institutions.
Prepared by Attorney General Phil L. Harnwn and staff.
QUESTION
l\1ay a branch bank be lawfully prohibited within
tlH• corporate limits of South Ogden, Utah, a city of tlH·
second class in which no unit bank is located, but which
is immediately adjacent to Ogden City, another city of
the second class in which are presently located five unit
hanks, where it is shown by the evidence that the primary
objective of the branch bank is not to serve South Ogden,
in which it is physically to be located, but rather to serv{·
Ogden1
CONCLUSION
Yes.

OPINION
The primary legislative restriction on the establishment of branch banks in the State of Utah states:
Except in cities of the first class, or within
unincorporated areas of a county in which a city
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of tlH' first class is located, no branch bank shall
he <'stablisht>d in any city or town in which is lo<'ated a bank or hanks, state or national, regularly
transacting a customary banking business, unless
the bauk seeking to establish such branch shall
take O\'Cr an existing bank. No unit bank organized
and OJlPrating at a point where there are other
01it•rating banks, statti or national, shall be perrnittt>d to be acquired by another bank for the
pnrpmw of <c•stablishing a branch until such bank
shall have bePn in operation as such for a period
of fi\·e years.'

The Utah 8tate Legislature has further specified
tl1at:
From and after the eff edive date of this act
no unit hank and no branch bank shall be established or anthorizPd to conduct a banking business
<>xcPpt as lwr<>inbPiore in section 7-3-6 expressly
J<'rom the forpgoing, it is apparent that the legislntin· dPlineation of those areas in which branch banks
and may not be established precludes the establish1nPnt of a branch bank in the City of Ogden, a city of the
se<'ond class, with certain <.>xceptions not applicable here. 3
\Yhile it is clear that a branch bank may not be
l'stablished in Ogden City with the factual basis presrnted, the question arises as to whether a branch bank
111a)- lw formed, in the immediately adjacent City of South
Ogden.
iUtah Code Ann. § 7-3-6 (Supp. 1967).
2Utah Code Ann. § 7-3-6.3 (Supp. 1967).
JBanks may establish branches by a "take
process,
the provision is specifically made inapplicable to cities of the first
class.

'27

Initially, it appears clear that Utah Code Ann.
7-3-6 (Supp. 1967) does not directly prohibit additional
branch banks in South Ogden, for the banking structnr ..
of that city does not include any so-called ''unit" banh.
However, the opposite assumption that a branch hank
must be established does not necessarily follow.
In addition to the legislative restrictions which havP
been discussed, those seeking authority for the develo11rnent of branch banking must satisfy other overriding
pr1:•requisites. The Utah StatP Legislature ha:,; providPrl
that:
No bank shall bP pnrnitkd to establish am
branch or office until it :,;hall first ha\·<· bePn
shown to tlw satisfaction ol' tlw hank co111111i:-:
siorn·r that tlu· public convPniencP and advantaw·
will be subsNved and promoted by the cstahlishlllPnt of such branch or office.4
Thus, after it is det<:•rrnined that the specifie statutOl'.\. prohibition does not foreclosP thP anticipated hranclt
hank, it is still incumbent upon tlw applicants to shcm
that the public conveniPnce and advantag<' will he suhserved h.'· the new facility.
It appears from the facts presented that the proposed facility is to be located within a ft'w fret of tlw
southern boundary of Ogden City. It fnrtlwr appPar:-;
that an objective of the applicant is to draw, not frorn
the banking market of South Ogden, but from the marht
of the Ogden metropolitan area generall_\-. It is po:,;sihlt>
to conclude that the applicant is ath•rnpting to t-ffrct
indirectly that which is otherwise specifically prohihikd
4Utah Code Ann. § 7-3-6 (Supp. 1967).
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liy the Utah

Legislature and which may not, therefor<', be done directly.

It is the opinion of this office that the Bank Comlllissioner may refuse to permit a branch bank in South
( >g<l<'n. The fact that the anticipated banking venture
does not fall within the specific statutory prohibition
dews not impose upon the commissioner an obligation to
approv<, the venture. The commissioner must further
he satisfied that the public convenience will be promoted.

ln Utah, a restrictive policy with respect to branch
banking has been enunciatted. 5 In the instant situation,
it wonld not be unreasonable for the Bank Commissioner
to <'onclude that the subject bank is attempting to invade
ill directly an area from which it is specifically excluded
statute. If such a determination were made, it would
he Pntirt'ly appropriate for the commissioner to thwart
tlw attt·rnpted subversion of the legislative policy against
hrand1 banking in second class cities where unit banks
<'Xist. 6 He need not subscribe to the geographical sophistr>· practiced by the applicant, and he may deny
the application on the simple ground that the public
ronvPnience and advantage will be subverted rather than
snhsPrved.
Dated this 26th day of July, 1968.

PLH/rjs/t'j

Res1wrtfull >, subrnitted,
Phil L. Hansen,
A ttornf'!' General

Bank & Trust Company v. Taylor. 15 Utah 2d 234, 390

P.2d 592 (1964).
6

Cf. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Saxon, 373 F.2d 283 (4th Cir.

1967).

